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Making Sense of Mind-Game Films:  
Narrative Complexity, Embodiment, and  
the Senses, by Simin Nina Littschwager. 




 Simin Nina Littschwager’s Making Sense of Mind-Game Films: Narrative Complexity, 
Embodiment, and the Senses offers a phenomenological approach to the concept of complexity in 
film. Littschwager develops her arguments and analysis around a set of six films, namely, The 
Sixth Sense (M. Night Shyamalan, 1999), The Others (Alejandro Amenábar, 2000), Memento 
(Christopher Nolan, 2000), Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999), Possible Worlds (Robert Lepage, 
2000), and Source Code (Duncan Jones, 2011). Littschwager’s main thesis asserts that mind-game 
films—a term introduced by Thomas Elsaesser in his 2009 essay “The Mind-Game Film”—need 
to be understood from the perspective of embodied experience, and beyond the predominantly 
visual and cognitive approaches that have so far been used to address the topic in film scholarship. 
Littschwager believes that complexity in film has been understood mainly as a brain-teaser effect 
where “the body and the senses play only a marginal role” (3). Mind-game films are part of a wider 
group of complex-narrative films and display “multiple and non-linear timelines, ontological and 
epistemological twists, parallel worlds, temporal loops, subjective plots, unreliable narrators, 
mentally deviant characters, and often ambiguous endings” (4). The complexity of mind-game 
films at the levels of narrative, themes and space representation has led scholars and critics to 
approach these films as “narrative puzzles whose main appeal lies in putting the pieces into the 
correct causal and linear order” (199). Instead of mere pieces of a puzzle that viewers put together 
and make sense of using purely their brainpower and intellect, Littschwager argues that mind-
game films are always a matter of “embodied activity, informed by the body and the senses as 
much as by the mental faculty” (199). For the purpose of describing the ways in which the six 
mind-game films in the book offer forms of embodied and sensory experience, Littschwager draws 
from so-called textural analysis, an approach derived from Jennifer Barker’s The Tactile Eye: 
Touch and the Cinematic Experience. According to Barker, textural analysis seeks to unveil 
meanings at deeper levels in the materiality of a film hidden by a focus on “visual, aural, and 
narrative aspects” of a film (25). Textural analysis follows a line of thought that goes back to 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work (Film; “Eye”; Visible; Phenomenology), and connects the 
phenomenological approach of Vivian Sobchack to the phenomenologically informed work of 
Laura Marks. For film phenomenologists, seeing cannot be separated from the body and from a 
personal, private experience of film that is unique to each viewer, and, although the essential nature 
of the film medium is primarily made of images, the images of a film should not be conflated 
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exclusively with the spectators’ modes of visual perception but with other realms of sensory 
experience. 
 
 In her analysis of the six mind-game films in her book, Littschwager describes how the 
body and the senses are key, not only for viewers to understand different levels complexity related 
to narrative, themes and character identity, but also for the characters themselves in those films to 
be who they perceive themselves to be. In The Sixth Sense and The Others, the materiality of the 
characters’ bodies give them an illusion of reality and existence in the world of the living and tricks 
them, as well as the viewers, into perceiving themselves as beings that exist in the world of the 
living. Despite the materiality of their existence, the characters’ experiences are dominated by their 
senses of touch and hearing. In that way, touch and hearing, rather than vision, become the 
prevailing epistemological senses in those films, the gateways to reality and meaning-making. 
 
 In Memento and Fight Club, the elusiveness of memory (Memento) and the unreliability of 
narration (Fight Club) cannot be solved solely by putting together the complex web of facts laid 
out by those films, but by using the body as a site of memory and using haptic experience and pain 
as ways to remember and know reality. Viewers can make sense of a mind-game film like 
Memento, which plays with contradiction and ambiguity, by engaging with the film in a haptic 
manner much like the main character in the film, Leonard (Guy Pearce), does when he tries to 
make sense of reality without being able to recollect his memories. In that context, Littschwager 
argues that touch can be more reliable than vision both for the characters and for the viewers alike. 
Finally, in Possible Worlds and Source Code, complexity is created and experienced through a 
sense of bodily, proprioceptive disorientation and being lost that results in the creation of multiple 
spatial layers that assign complexity to the two films. 
 
 The originality of Littschwager’s approach lies at her intersecting complexity in film and 
phenomenology with a focus on sensory experience and a rich stylistic analysis of the six films in 
the book. Littschwager traces a solid overview of previous approaches to complexity in film which 
will prove useful for anyone exploring related subjects. Littschwager describes how the complexity 
and mind tricks posed by mind-game films have been explained predominantly as an activity of 
and for the mind and intellect of spectators, as in Miklós Kiss and Steven Willemsen’s book 
Impossible Puzzles or in Elsaesser and Malte Hagener’s Film Theory Theory: An Introduction 
Through the Senses. Littschwager’s thorough and in-depth review of the scholarship produced on 
the subject of complexity in film is not only valuable for readers to assess the critical approaches 
to the subject but also helps to contextualise and position Littschwager’s approach and its 
originality. Similarly helpful is Littschwager’s definition of the concept of complexity in film, and 
the variety of film examples that fall into different categories of complexity offering a solid lineage 
of mind-game films. 
 
 Littschwager’s analysis of the six films has a formal nature, almost appearing to be more 
of a neoformalist approach in the likes of David Bordwell than a more personal, direct description 
of experience that is often found in the work of film phenomenologists. That fact makes 
Littschwager’s approach even more unique and, in my view, more interdisciplinary and rich for 
the reader. Nonetheless, Littschwager delineates a solid connecting line to Sobchack’s, Marks’s 
and Barker’s phenomenological approaches, distancing herself from cognitive film theory, with 
which Bordwell is associated. Cognitive film theory has been strongly connected to Bordwell’s 
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idea of film comprehension based on human narrative as a matter of cognition and mental decoding 
in a way that can be considered somewhat dualistic (mind vs. body) and disembodied by not always 
weighing in the role of the senses in the experience of a film. Although Littschwager’s distantiation 
from cognitive film theory is relevant to a certain point, it becomes a permanent, and somewhat 
distracting effort throughout the book. Littschwager’s attempt to delineate the territory of her own 
approach may be perceived by readers as a detour from her argument. Instead, Littschwager could 
have been predominately phenomenological and still benefitted from arguments made by cognitive 
film theory when appropriate, such as in Daniel Barratt’s helpful analysis of The Sixth Sense. 
 
 Littschwager’s approach to issues of cinematic complexity through film phenomenology 
and formal analysis makes this book an original and valuable study of the subject. Nonetheless, 
while making her point about the role of the senses and embodiment in the experience of 
complexity in film, Littschwager tends to consider visuality and sight as somewhat disembodied 
levels of experience. Littschwager often connects vision to disembodiment given that vision is 
considered a distal sense that does not require the involvement of the viewer’s body as much as a 
proximal sense as touch does. Drawing on Marks’ notion of haptic visuality and referring to The 
Sixth Sense, Littschwager discusses a Cartesian notion of vision and knowledge where vision 
offers a detached and observational knowledge of film rather than a proximal and multisensory 
experience that touch offers. However, vision is as embodied as any other sense and is a gateway 
to embodied experience and to other senses. Spectators can perceive textures in a film primarily 
through visual and aural sensory information. Certainly, textures are not just a matter of touch but 
are intricately connected to multiple senses. Sight also modulates embodied startle responses to 
film, and shapes the viewers’ awareness of space, movement, or even pain, as Littschwager points 
out (134). Although an author like Stanley Cavell will refer to a primarily ocular mode of access 
to a filmic world, that does not necessarily represent a detraction from the experiential and 
embodied dimensions of a film. Cavell is not so much denying the experiential nature of film by 
referring to film’s visual nature, but is, in fact, pointing out that access to a film’s experiential 
world is primarily through visual and aural sensory information. Experiential access can be visual 
and the cumulative filmic experience can still be multisensory and belong to different realms of 
sensory experience. On that point, Cavell’s idea of sensory access does not, contrary to 
Littschwager’s assertion, seem inaccurate. Neither does it appear necessary for Littschwager to 
consider vision to be disembodied nor vision to be oppositional to other senses in order for one to 
find validity in her main ideas. On the contrary, the opposition of sight with the other senses 
throughout the book feels more like a distraction from Littschwager’s main ideas rather than a 
useful artefact. 
 
 Despite her conception of sight as disembodied and sight as not offering a haptic mode of 
knowledge of a film’s world, Littschwager’s book is an undeniably valuable addition to the 
scholarship on the subject of complexity in film, and is, moreover, an original contribution to film 
phenomenology for its detailed formal analysis of film’s sensory appeal based on a stylistic 
analysis of camera movement, framing and other audiovisual elements that are not usually as 
closely explored by film phenomenologists. Littschwager delineates important layers of the mind-
game film that go beyond narrative complexity and shows us that knowing and experiencing a film 
exceeds intellectual and mental activities. Sensory experience is not just a coating layer of film but 
an essential way to understand film’s materiality and human experience. Littschwager’s book 
shows that film cannot be understood by mere textual or even cultural analysis and, ultimately, the 
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role of sensory experience should not be only an alternative component of film scholarship but a 
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